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COMMON LAW STRICT LIABILITY AGAINST THE
MANUFACTURERS AND SELLERS OF SATURDAY
NIGHT SPECIALS: CIRCUMVENTING CALIFORNIA
CIVIL CODE SECTION 1714.4
I. INTRODUCTION
Saturday Night Specials, a type of small, easily concealed,
poorly made handgun, pose an especially serious problem for law
enforcement officials in their efforts to reduce the high rate of violent
crime in the United States.' In 1968, Congress passed the Gun Con-
trol Act,2 which proscribes the importation of Saturday Night Spe-
cials.' The Act's efficacy, however, continues to be compromised by a
loophole which enables foreign national handgun manufacturers to
ship disassembled handguns for assembly and sale in the United
States." Not since 1972, when the United States Senate passed legis-
lation to forbid the sale of Saturday Night Specials, has Congress
come close to banning this weapon which is primarily used for crim-
inal purposes."
In response to continuing congressional inertia on this issue, re-
cent efforts to stem the widespread availability and criminal use of
Saturday Night Specials have focused increasingly upon the courts.6
e 1987 by Garrett Sanderson III
1. See infra note 24.
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1979).
3. Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common-Law Ap-
proach, 51 FOROHAM L. Rv. 771, 790 n.120 (1983) [hereinafter Note] (indicating that 18
U.S.C. § 925(d)(3), which prohibits the importation of firearms not "recognized as particularly
suitable for sporting purposes," is interpreted in regulations issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury to forbid the importation of Saturday Night Specials).
4. Id. at 790-91.
5. See Note, supra note 3, at 791 n.122. In 1972, the Senate passed S. 2507, a bill to
prohibit the sale of firearms not "readily adaptable to sporting purposes." This legislation died
in the House of Representatives because pursuant to congressional rules of parliamentary pro-
cedure, it was not approved by the House of Representatives prior to the adjournment of the
92d Congress. Id. See J. WRIGHT, P. Rossi & K. DALY, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS,
CRIME AND VIOI.ENCE IN AMERICA 17, 178 (1983) [hereinafter WRIGHT]. ("Evidence from
several sources makes it clear that the handgun is the preferred firearm in most crimes involv-
ing firearms.") Id. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms estimates that during the
period 1973-75, 45% of the handguns confiscated pursuant to a criminal investigation were
Saturday Night Specials. Id. at 178.
6. See generally Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912,
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Plaintiffs' suits against the manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials
seek to impose liability under various theories of strict liability. Yet
not until the decision in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.' had any
state's high court s sided with the plaintiffs' position. The Kelley
court imposed liability on the manufacturer and seller of a Saturday
Night Special using a novel theory of strict products liability.' Its
holding is grounded in the strong public policy of the State of
Maryland against handgun sales for purposes other than law en-
forcement, sport, and personal protection.1"
Prior to the ruling in Kelley, the State of California enacted an
amendment to its Civil Code."1 Section 1714.4 provides: "In a pro-
ducts liability action, no firearm . . . shall be deemed defective in
design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not outweigh
the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury . . .
when discharged."1 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
cited section 1714.4 in affirming a summary judgment for the de-
fendant manufacturer of a Saturday Night Special. 3 In refusing to
embrace the Kelley decision, the court of appeals declared, "There is
no indication in California law or public policy that the courts
would distinguish 'Saturday [N]ight [S]pecials' from other handguns
or find them of so little utility that the risk of injury outweighs their
beneficial uses for recreation or protection."1 4
This comment presents a plaintiff's case for a cause of action in
strict products liability against the manufacturer of a Saturday Night
Special. California law and public policy evince that Saturday Night
Specials serve no legitimate purposes.1 ' A court would not be in der-
ogation of section 1714.4 by adopting the theory of strict products
liability enunciated by Kelley. Rather, section 1714.4 is controlling
only in those cases where the manufacturer, by reference to the
1925 (1984) [hereinafter Handguns]: "A troubling aspect of the debate over handguns is the
impression that those who advocate a products liability theory do so because they are dissatis-
fied with the results of the democratic process and wish the courts to overturn those results."
Id.
7. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
8. In Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd sub
noma, Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985), the court ruled that the sale of
handguns might constitute an ultrahazardous activity.
9. 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
10. Id. at 144-46, 497 A.2d at 1152-53.
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1985).
12. Id.
13. Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986).
14. Id. at 1328.
15. See infra notes 155-68 and accompanying text.
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handgun control laws and public policy of California, demonstrates
that the particular type of handgun serves some legitimate purposes.
II. THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL
There is no universally accepted definition of a Saturday Night
Special. The Saturday Night Special is a small, inexpensive, cheaply
constructed, low caliber handgun. 6 Saturday Night Specials com-
monly retail for under $50, and frequently may be purchased for
between $10 and $20.'1 The easy concealability of the weapon is
another commonly noted characteristic,'" and is a natural conse-
quence of its small size. Proponents of efforts to ban Saturday Night
Specials argue that these handguns are the preferred weapon of
criminals."
However, not all small handguns are Saturday Night Specials.
Many small handguns are well made. They are purchased by indi-
viduals for sport, collection, and self-protection. Law enforcement
officials and the armed forces also are regular purchasers of small
handguns." These are recognized as legitimate purposes for hand-
gun ownership. Thus it should not be surprising that efforts to ban
all handguns have been equally eschewed by state and federal legis-
latures, as well as by the courts.
On the other hand, the cheap construction and short barrel of a
Saturday Night Special render it totally inappropriate for target
shooting and hunting.2 The low caliber of this particular type of
handgun also diminishes its effectiveness for purposes of self-de-
fense.2 Law enforcement officials have testified during congressional
hearings that the Saturday Night Special is a menace to law enforce-
ment efforts.24 In spite of evidence that Saturday Night Specials
16. McClain, Prohibiting the 'Saturday Night Special:' A Feasible Policy Option?
FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE 201-02 (1984) [hereinafter McClain]. "The term 'Saturday NightSpecials' . . . has no universal definition. It usually refers to two groups of characteristics of
the weapon: (1) short barrel, low caliber, and small size, which maximizes concealability; and(2) cheap construction from low tensile strength materials, which minimizes the price." Id.
17. WRIGH'r, supra note 5, at 17.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 178.
20. Handguns, supra note 6, at 1915; see also Kelley, 304 Md. at 158, 497 A.2d at
1160.
21. Kelley, 304 Md. at 158, 497 A.2d at 1160.
22. McClain, supra note 16, at 202-03.
23. Id.
24. Kelley, 304 Md. at 145 n.9, 497 A.2d at 1153 n.9 (citing Hearings on S. 2507
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 109-10 (1971) (testimony of Geoffrey Alprin, General Counsel
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serve no legitimate purposes, the issue of whether their sale should
be prohibited has not received serious attention from state and fed-
eral legislatures. 5 As a result, an increasing number of individuals
who are victimized by Saturday Night Specials have turned to the
courts in an effort to eliminate this type of handgun from the
marketplace.
III. FAILED THEORIES OF STRICT LIABILITY AGAINST
HANDGUN MANUFACTURERS
Plaintiffs' suits against handgun manufacturers for injuries to
innocent third persons, not all of which involve Saturday Night Spe-
cials, have relied primarily upon three theories of strict liability: (1)
selling handguns is an abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous
activity;"6 (2) the design of the handgun is defective based upon the
principles of the Restatement of Torts (Second) section 402A,27 and
(3) the design is defective because the risk of serious injury to others
inherent in the design of the handgun outweighs its social benefits.
8
Plaintiffs also have predicated strict liability upon a duty of the man-
ufacturer to control the distribution of handguns to better ensure that
they do not fall into the hands of criminals 9 and, alternatively, upon
of the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C.). Mr. Aiprin testified:
[T]he 'Saturday Night Special' presents law enforcement problems in tracing
and identifying such weapons when they are used to commit criminal offenses.
Generally, the weapon is manufactured from soft, inexpensive metal. As a re-
sult, serial numbers are easily and sometimes completely erased by either filing
or melting. And ballistics examination of such weapons, in order to determine if
a fired bullet was discharged from a recovered weapon, is many times made
impossible because the metal in the weapon is of such low quality that the char-
acteristics of the barrel are altered every time the weapon is fired.
Id.)
25. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
26. Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd sub
nom, Perkins v. F.LE. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Harrington and
Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Patterson v. Gescellschaft, 608 F. Supp.
1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Il. App. 3d 642, 447
N.E.2d 1293 (1985); Kelly, 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985); Burkett v. Freedom Arms,
Inc., 299 Or. 551, 704 P.2d 118 (1985).
27. Martin, 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Patterson, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex.
1985); Riordan, 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985); Kelly, 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d
1143 (1985); Cf Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1983) (strict liability
based upon a warranty theory, the test of which nevertheless is similar to section 402A). See
infra note 51 and accompanying text.
28. Martin, 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Patterson, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex.
1985); Kelley, 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
29. Riordan, 132 Il. App. 3d at 645, 477 N.E.2d at 1295 (where, as an alternative
basis of liability, plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer and seller of a .38 caliber handgun
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a duty to warn the consumer of the likelihood of serious injury if
handguns are improperly used.3"
A. Abnormally Dangerous Activity
The theory of strict liability for an abnormally dangerous or an
ultrahazardous activity is predicated upon sections 519 and 520 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 An abnormally dangerous
activity involves risks which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of
even the highest standard of care. 2 Some of the criteria which the
trier of fact, usually a jury, considers in determining whether or not
an activity is abnormally dangerous are the existence of a high risk
of harm and the probability that the harm will be great; the appro-
priateness of the activity to the place where it occurs; whether the
activity is a common one; and the extent to which the risks of the
failed to take "adequate precautions to prevent the sale of its' [sic] handguns to persons who
were reasonably likely to cause harm to the general public."); Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1214
(plaintiff contended that the indiscriminate sale of handguns to the public makes it "too easy
for handguns to be obtained by persons who misuse them.").
30. Riordan, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 647, 477 N.E.2d at 1296 (Plaintiff also claimed that
the defendants had a "duty to provide adequate warnings to consumers that possession of a
handgun is dangerous .. ") Id.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRus §§ 519, 520 (1965). Note that California con-
tinues to adhere to the Restatement (First) theory of ultrahazardous activity. 4 WITKIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw 3096-104 (8th ed.1974). An ultrahazardous activity is one which:
(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common
usage. RESrATEMENT OF TORrs § 520 (1938). See also Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489,
190 P.2d 1 (1948); Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center, 168 Cal. App. 3d 333, 345, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 194, 201 (1985). In Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 283 (1985), the court stated that:
The doctrine of ultrahazardous activity provides that one who undertakes an
ultrahazardous activity is liable to every person who is injured as a proximate
result of that activity, regardless of the amount of care he uses. (citations omit-
ted). The doctrine of ultrahazardous activity focuses not on a product and its
defects but upon an activity intentionally undertaken by the defendant, which by
its very nature is very dangerous.
Id. at 85, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
The findings of a California court should be similar to the holdings of courts in other
states which have ruled on the applicability of the doctrine of strict liability for an abnormally
dangerous activity since in all of those cases the courts focused on the activity of selling hand-
guns rather than upon the handgun itself. See supra note 26.
32. RE.STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519, comment d:
The liability stated in this Section is not based . . . upon any negligence. . ..
The defendant is held liable although he has exercised the utmost care to pre-
vent the harm to the plaintiff that has ensued. The liability arises out of the
abnormal danger of the activity itself, and the risk that it creates, of harm to
those in the vicinity.
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activity outweigh its social value." However, only one court has held
that the sale of handguns might constitute an abnormally dangerous
activity. 84
In Richman v. Charter Arms Corp.," the decedent's mother
brought a wrongful death action against the manufacturer of a "snub
nose .38" caliber pistol." Plaintiffs daughter, a medical student at
Tulane University, was kidnapped, robbed, raped and then mur-
dered.3" Her assailant allegedly committed the murder with a
handgun manufactured by Charter Arms Corporation. 8 The court
embraced the plaintiff's theory that the sale of handguns might con-
stitute an abnormally dangerous activity and dismissed the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 9 The court held that
handguns are not an item of normal use4' and ruled that the defend-
ant's activity presented a question of fact on the issue of whether
marketing a handgun is abnormally dangerous. 41 The decision in
Richman was pointedly criticized in subsequent decisions before it
was overruled.
The majority opinion in Martin v. Harrington and
Richardson, Inc.42 reproved the rationale of Richman on the
grounds that it "blurs the distinction between strict liability for sell-
ing unreasonably dangerous products and strict liability for engaging
in ultrahazardous activities by making the sale of a product an activ-
ity."" The court held that marketing handguns is not an ul-
trahazardous activity."" The impact of a contrary holding, according
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 (1965).
34. Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd sub
nom, Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250.
35. 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983).
36. Id. at 193.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 194.
39. Id. at 209.
40. Id. at 202. The court maintained:
Handguns are not an item of 'general use'; they are an item of extraordinary or
abnormal use. Many people in the community are likely on an average day to
operate an automobile, to consume a drink, or to use a knife. Few people, how-
ever, are likely to use a handgun except in highly unusual circumstances - when
attacked by a criminal assailant, for example, or when acting as a criminal as-
sailant. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that the operation of handguns is 'a
matter of common usage.'
Id.
41. Id. at 204. "[Tlhe Court cannot find as a matter of law that the defendant's market-
ing practices are exempt from being classified as ultrahazardous." d.
42. 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984).
43. Id. at 1204.
44. Id. at 1203. "If plaintiffs were claiming that the use of a handgun was an
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to the court, also might subject the manufacturers and sellers of
knives to absolute liability if a knife were used by a criminal to in-
jure or kill someone." This kind of misuse, of either a knife or a
handgun, is not a foreseeable consequence of~their manufacture or
sale."4
The notion that the sale of handguns constitutes an abnormally
dangerous activity also has been rejected in those jurisdictions where
the application of the theory is limited to activities related to the use
and ownership of land.47 Thus, in overturning Richman, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp." held that the
district court had misapplied Louisiana law on abnormally danger-
ous activities. Further, the appellate court took issue with the district
court's reasoning in applying this theory to the sale of handguns. 49
The court acknowledged that the use of handguns involves a high
degree of risk, but framed the issue as whether the sale, rather than
the use or misuse, of handguns is a matter of common usage.50
.Because the courts which have considered this theory of liability
focus on the activity of selling a firearm rather than upon the Satur-
day Night Special itself, an increasing number of plaintiffs' suits are
based on strict products liability in tort.
ultrahazardous activity the argument would clearly fit within the parameters of Illinois law.
However, plaintiffs' attempt to impose strict liability for engaging in an ultrahazardous activ-
ity upon the sale of a non-defective product is unprecedented in Illinois. ... Id.
45. Id. at 1204. "A change in this policy ...would require that manufacturers of
guns, knives, drugs, alcohol, tobacco and other dangerous products act as insurers against all
damage produced by their products." Id.
46. Id. at 1205.
47. Perkins, 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Kelley, 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143
(1985).
48. 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
49. Id. at 1265 n.43. "[A]lthough the use of handguns may involve a high degree of risk
and a likelihood of great harm, it is the marketing of handguns that is alleged to be abnor-
mally dangerous. . . . [T]he risks of harm from handguns do not come from their sale and
distribution as such." Id. The court held that:
[T]he direct cause of the plaintiffs' injuries was not the marketing of handguns;
the cause was the criminal misuse of those handguns by persons not agents or
employees of the defendants. . . .The kinds of injuries for which the plaintiffs
seek to hold the defendants absolutely liable, therefore, are injuries that result
from the 'substandard' - here, criminal - conduct of unrelated third parties.
The doctrine of ultrahazardous activities is therefore unavailable to the plain-
tiffs under Louisiana law.
Id. at 1268.
50. Id. at 1255-56. "All of the activities ...for which liability has been imposed [in
Louisiana] originated in a landowner or custodian's use or abuse of land or immovable prop-
erty in such a way as to cause injury to another person." Id.
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B. Restatement of Torts Section 402A
Strict liability against the manufacturer or seller of a product is
imposed under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts if
a defect renders the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer. 1 Many of the suits against handgun manufacturers ask
the courts to impose strict liability on the grounds that handguns are
defective because their small size makes them peculiarly attractive
for criminal uses and, consequently, unreasonably dangerous."
In Riordan v. International Armament Corp.," the plaintiffs'
decedent was shot and killed while attempting to restrain someone in
a restaurant." The gun used to shoot him was manufactured by
Walther Waffenfabrik, GmbH, a West German corporation, and
distributed in this country by International Armament Corpora-
tion." The decedent's survivors filed a wrongful death action against
Waffenfabrik and International Armament Corporation under a the-
ory of strict liability for the sale of a defective product.6  Plaintiffs
contended that because the gun was small, easy to conceal, and rela-
tively inexpensive, it served no useful social purpose and thus was
defective in design."
Although Illinois has adopted section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts," the court ruled that a product is defective under
section 402A only when, "in light of its nature and intended func-
tion," it does not perform in a manner which the ordinary consumer
would expect. 9 The court was unable to find that the handgun's
inherent characteristics, including its small size, easy concealability,
51. RES'rATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment (i) (1965).
52. Martin, 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Patterson, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex.
1985); Riordan, 132 11. App.3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293; Kelley, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d
1143; Cf Mavilia, 574 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1983) (same argument under a warranty
theory of strict liability).
53. 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985).
54. Id. at 645, 477 N.E.2d at 1294.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 645, 477 N.E.2d at 1295.
57. Id. at 650, 477 N.E.2d at 1297-98. Note that the Kelley court accepted precisely this
position, but not based upon section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Kelley
court rejected section 402A because that section predicates liability upon whether the product
performs as intended by an ordinary consumer or user. Section 402A does not afford room for
the consideration of a product's utility or lack thereof. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 136, 497 A.2d at
1148.
58. Riordan, 132 I1. App. 3d at 649, 477 N.E.2d at 1298.
59. Id. at 650, 477 N.E.2d at 1298. "The alleged design defects of size and con-
cealability of the defendants' handguns were not conditions which caused the handgun to fail
to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of its nature and intended func-
tion." Id.
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and low price, rendered the product unreasonably dangerous in the
sense that it did not perform as an ordinary consumer would
expect. 60 Rather, the handgun fired when the trigger was pulled; it
did precisely what it was intended to do. There was nothing "wrong
with the product or the way it performed.""'
C. RisklUtility
California and a handful of other states"' apply a risk/utility
analysis in order to determine whether a product that causes injury
is defective in design. The leading California case is Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co.," where the Supreme Court articulated a two-
prong test for design defects:
[A] product is defective in design if (1) the plaintiff proves that
the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foresee-
able manner, or (2) the plaintiff proves that the product's design
proximately caused injury and the defendant fails to prove, in
light of the relevant factors, that on balance the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design.6"
No California court has ruled on the applicability of the risk/
utility prong of Barker in a suit against the manufacturer or seller of
a Saturday Night Special. Civil Code section 1714.4 was enacted
when two such suits were pending.65 However, a United States Dis-
trict Court sitting in Texas has issued a ruling based upon the risk/
utility test in a products liability suit against a handgun
manufacturer.
In Patterson v. Rohm Gescellschaft,"' the plaintiff's son, a clerk
at a convenience store, was killed during an attempted robbery.67
The gun used to shoot the plaintiff's decedent was a Rohm .38 cali-
60. Id.
61. Id. "ITIhe plaintiffs have cited no Illinois decision in which it has been [held] that
an entire product line may be held to be defectively designed where the plaintiff's injury was
caused by that product's operation precisely as it was designed to operate." Id.
62. Alaska, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, and Oregon ap-
ply a risk/utility analysis. Kelley, 304 Md. at 137, 497 A.2d at 1149.
63. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
64. Id. at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
65. California Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 1983-84 Regular Session, Analysis of
Assembly Bill 75 at 2. [Hereinafter Senate Analysis].
66. 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
67. Id. at 1208.
1987]
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ber revolver. 6 Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against
Rohm Gescellschaft and R.G. Industries alleging that the handgun
was defective in design because the risk of injury posed by this type
of handgun outweighed its social benefits.69 Plaintiff conceded that
there was nothing mechanically wrong with the way the handgun
performed."' Instead, the plaintiff argued that a handgun used for
illegal purposes should be subject to a risk/utility test in order to
determine if it is defective in design."
In rejecting the plaintiff's theory of liability, the court explained
that, "[u]nder Texas law, there can be no products liability recovery
unless the product does have a defect. Without this essential predi-
cate, that something is wrong with the product, the risk/utility bal-
ancing test does not apply."72 The court reasoned that holding a
handgun manufacturer strictly liable when one of its products is
improperly used would be akin to applying strict liability to the
manufacturer of a knife or a match if either of those products were
improperly used.7 Handguns, knives, and matches all have socially
redeeming uses. The court cautioned: "Handguns are collected as a
hobby and are used for target shooting and hunting, as well as for
self-defense. ' '1 4 Unlike the Patterson court, the ruling in Kelley
directly addresses the issue of whether Saturday. Night Specials serve
any useful purposes.
68. Id. The court identified the weapon as a Saturday Night Special. Id. at 1207.
69. Id. at 1208.
70. Id. at 1210.
71. Id. "[Tihe plaintiff's attorneys argue that (i) Texas law no longer requires a show-
ing that the product is defective; (ii) that the word 'defective' in § 402A is merely synonymous
with the phrase 'unreasonably dangerous'; and (iii) that the jury may simply apply the 'risk/
utility test' to any product (whether or not it has a defect)." Id. Also note that one of the
plaintiff's attorneys was Windle Turley, the author of Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liabil-
ity to Handgun Victims, 10 N. KY. L. Ri:v. 41 (1982). Mr. Turley is regarded as the princi-
pal proponent of imposing strict liability upon the manufacturers and sellers of handguns,
although not exclusively Saturday Night Specials, based upon a risk/utility test for defective
design.
72. Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1211.
73. Id. at 1212, (citing Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825, 828 (1973)).
74. Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1210-11 n.l. The Patterson court at least implicitly
suggests that Saturday Night Specials serve some legitimate purposes. Assuming arguendo that
the laws and policies of the State of Texas are dissimilar to those of Maryland and California,
the only probable legitimate purpose of a Saturday Night Special is self-protection. See supra
text accompanying notes 20-24. However, the Kelley court declared that, as a matter of law,
because of their short barrels, light weight, easy concealability, poor manufacture, inaccuracy
and unreliability, Saturday Night Specials are "virtually useless for the legitimate purposes of
.. . protection of persons, property and business." 304 Md. at 144-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54.
Admittedly, the court's statements are at times equivocal.
[Vol. 27
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IV. Kelley v. R.G. Industries
In holding that the manufacturer or seller of a Saturday Night
Special can be found strictly liable for the injuries inflicted upon the
victim of a shooting that occurs during the commission of a crime,
the Maryland Court of Appeals in Kelley 5 applied a novel common
law theory of strict liability.76 The court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ments for the imposition of liability pursuant to sections 402A, 519
and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as well as an applica-
tion of the risk/utility test of Barker.7 Instead, the court held that
"the common law adapts to fit the needs of society. Consequently, we
shall recognize a separate, limited area of strict liability for the man-
ufacturers, as well as all in the marketing chain of Saturday Night
Specials."' 78 Three reasons were given in support of the holding: (1)
Saturday Night Specials serve "no legitimate social purpose in
today's Society;" (2) the manufacturer knows or should know that
the primary use of a Saturday Night Special is criminal activity; and
(3) the manufacturer is more blameworthy than the innocent
victim. 7
9
The plaintiff in Kelley was injured during an armed robbery of
the grocery store where he was employed.80 The perpetrator of that
crime shot him with an R.G. 38S. s" Plaintiff filed suit in state court
against the manufacturer, Rohm Gescellschaft (Rohm), a West
German corporation, and R.G. Industries, its United States subsidi-
ary and distributor.8" Rohm removed the case to the Federal District
Court of Maryland." R.G. Industries subsequently was dismissed
from the action by stipulation of both parties.8"
The district court certified three questions to the Maryland
Court of Appeals." The Maryland court examined both federal and
75. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
76. It should be noted that the section 402A of the Restatement test and the risk/utility
test of design defects also are common law theories of strict liability.
77. Kelley, 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
78. Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
79. Id. at 154-57, 497 A.2d at 1158-59.
80. Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1144.
81. Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1144-45.
82. Id. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145.
83. Id.
84. Id. Consider the irony of dismissing R.G. Industries in view of the court's holding
that liability could be imposed upon both the manufacturer and seller of a Saturday Night
Special. See infra note 97.
85. The court considered whether (1) a handgun manufacturer generally may be held
liable for injuries to third-party victims of handgun crimes; (2) Saturday Night Specials are
regularly used to perpetrate handgun crimes; and (3) the particular handgun constitutes a
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state policies on handgun sales, ownership, and use and concluded
that imposing strict liability upon the manufacturer and seller of a
Saturday Night Special would further those policies.86 The court
cited the federal Gun Control Act of 1968,87 which prohibits the im-
portation of Saturday Night Specials,88 and two Maryland statutes
as the impetus for the ruling.8
Because of the legitimate uses of handguns recognized by the
Maryland gun control law, including hunting, law enforcement, and
protection of one's self, residence and business, the court determined
that federal and state policies would not countenance the imposition
of strict liability upon the manufacturers of all handguns. 90 The
Maryland court recognized certain inherent differences in Saturday
Night Specials and other handguns:
There is, however, a limited category of handguns which clearly
is not sanctioned as a matter of public policy. . . . This type of
handgun, commonly known as a 'Saturday Night Special',
presents particular problems for law enforcement officials. Sat-
Saturday Night Special. Kelley, 304 Md. at 131, 497 A.2d at 1146.
86. Id. at 155-57, 497 A.2d at 1158-59.
87. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1979).
88. Section 922 of the Gun-Control Act enunciates certain unlawful acts with respect to
the importation of firearms, and section 925 delegates authority to the Secretary of the Trea-
sury to issue appropriate regulations, including prohibitions on the importation of Saturday
Night Specials. Note, supra note 3, at 790-91.
89. Kelley, 304 Md. at 142-44 nn.5-7, 497 A.2d at 1151-53 nn.5-7. The Maryland
statutes make it unlawful to carry a handgun without a permit. Id. at 143-44 n.7, 497 A.2d at
1152-53 n.7, (citing Art. 27, § 36B(b), of the Maryland Code). Section 36B(b) prohibits the
wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun; section 36B(c)(2) provides, "Nothing in this
section shall prevent the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by any person to
whom a permit to wear, carry or transport any such weapon has been issued under section
36E of this article." Id. Exemptions to the permit requirement are provided for law enforce-
ment personnel and members of the armed forces. Kelley, 304 Md. at 142-43 n.6, 497 A.2d at
1151-52 n.6. Additional exemptions are provided for persons who are transporting a handgun
between the place of purchase and their residence; their place of residence and their place of
business; and to and from a hunting trip or other sporting event. Id. A person also is author-
ized to carry or wear a handgun at his residence or business without a permit. Id.
The Maryland statutes are premised upon an awareness that many violent crimes are
committed by persons using handguns and a corresponding intent to reduce the number of
violent crimes that are perpetrated by such persons. Id. at 141, 497 A.2d at 1151. The pream-
ble to article 27 provides, in part:
(i) There has, in recent years, been an alarming increase in the number of
violent crimes perpetrated in Maryland, and a high percentage of those crimes
involve the use of handguns; (ii) The result has been a substantial increase in
the number of persons killed or injured which is traceable, in large part, to the
carrying of handguns on the streets and public ways by persons inclined to use
them in criminal activity. . ..
Id.
90. 304 Md. at 142-44, 497 A.2d at 1152-53.
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urday Night Specials are generally characterized by short bar-
rels, light weight, easy concealability, low cost, use of cheap
quality materials, poor manufacture, inaccuracy and unreliabil-
ity. These characteristics render the Saturday Night Special
particularly attractive for criminal use and virtually useless for
the legitimate purposes of law enforcement, sport, and protec-
tion of persons, property and business. 1
The court's holding is further narrowed by its refusal to pre-
cisely define a Saturday Night Special." It left that determination to
the jury, with one caveat: high quality, small handguns which can be
legitimately used by law enforcement personnel are not Saturday
Night Specials." A handgun which might constitute a Saturday
Night Special will be characterized by small size and short barrel
length, poor workmanship, low cost, and questionable reliability.
4
The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating to the court that the
handgun in question "possesses sufficient characteristics of a Satur-
day Night Special."" If the proper showing is made, the issue then
goes to the jury." If the jury determines that the handgun is a
Saturday Night Special, liability may be imposed upon both the
manufacturer and the seller, 97 provided certain other conditions are
91. Id. at 144-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54. The court also stated:
Saturday Night Specials are largely unfit for any of the recognized legitimate
uses sanctioned by the Maryland gun control legislation. They are too inaccu-
rate, unreliable, and poorly made for use by law enforcement personnel,
sportsmen, homeowners or businessmen. . . . The chief 'value' a Saturday
Night Special has is in criminal activity, because of its easy concealability and
low price.
Id. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158.
92. Id. at 158, 497 A.2d at 1159. "[A] handgun should rarely, if ever, be deemed a
Saturday Night Special as a matter of law. Instead, it is a finding to be made by the trier of
facts." Id.
93. Id. The Maryland court's guidance for the jury is rather amorphous:
[T]he General Assembly of Maryland has recognized the need for certain per-
sons to carry guns, for example, law enforcement personnel and persons with
special permits. Non-uniformed law enforcement personnel and certain permit
holders will of necessity be required to carry small, short barreled handguns. A
high quality, small, short barreled handgun, designed for such legitimate use, is
not a Saturday Night Special, and the trier of facts should not be permitted to
speculate otherwise.
d. Based on the foregoing, it is not entirely clear whether the focus is upon the materials and
workmanship of the weapon or whether it is a type typically possessed by law enforcement
personnel or persons with permits to carry concealed weapons.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. "[O]nce the trier of facts determines that a handgun is a Saturday Night Special,
then liability may be imposed against a manufacturer or anyone else in the marketing chain,
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satisfied. 8
The scope of the court's holding applies only to injuries
sustained by third persons who are shot with a Saturday Night Spe-
cial sold after the date of the decision." Except for the plaintiff in
Kelley, no cause of action would be recognized for the victim of a
shooting involving a Saturday Night Special sold prior to the court's
ruling. 00 However, the manufacturer and seller of the Saturday
Night Special bear the burden of proof that the gun was sold prior
to the date of the decision. 1
Of additional interest is the Kelley court's treatment of the risk/
utility test of Barker. Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has
yet to adopt a risk/utility standard for determining whether a prod-
uct contains a design defect, the court did address the plaintiff's
exhortation that such a test ought to be adopted under the facts.' 2
The court disposed of the plaintiff's contentions on the basis that,
before the risk/utility test can be applied, the product must malfunc-
tion.1 8 When a Saturday Night Special fires in the direction in
which it is aimed and is intentionally discharged, there is no mal-
function in the design of the product.'0 4 This is the identical burden
of proof requirement that has been erected by California Civil Code
section 1714.4, when a third person who has been shot by a Satur-
day Night Special or any other firearm brings an action against the
manufacturer or seller under a risk/utility theory of strict products
liability. However, the provisions of that section do not proscribe an
extension of the Kelley decision in California.
including the retailer." Id.
98. Id. at 158-59, 497 A.2d at 1160. The plaintiff or plaintiff's decedent must have
suffered injury or death as a result of having been shot by someone with a Saturday Night
Special. Also, the shooting must result from a criminal act, and the plaintiff or plaintiff's
decedent must not have been a party to the crime. Id.
99. Id. at 162, 497 A.2d at 1162.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 162 n.31, 497 A.2d at 1162 n.31. The "facts concerning the date of sale to a
member of the public can be ascertained much more easily by the defendants than the plain-
tiff." Id. The court's finding on this issue could be explained based upon the manufacturer's
superior ability to identify the date of manufacturer through, e.g., cross-referencing the serial
number of a particular handgun to the manufacturer's own records identifying the date of
manufacture.
102. Id. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
103. Id. "We believe ... that . . .[tihis standard is only applied when something goes
wrong with a product." Id.
104. Id.
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V. CIVIL CODE SECTION 1714.4
Any strict products liability suit filed in California against the
manufacturer or seller of a Saturday Night Special is subject to Civil
Code section 1714.4."'5 The plaintiff should urge the court to
narrowly interpret that section. Specifically, the plaintiff's attorney
must convince the court that section 1714.4 is intended only to pro-
hibit a finding of liability based on the risk/utility test for determin-
ing whether a product is defective in design. In order to determine
the proper scope of section 1714.4, it is necessary to analyze the
statute."'0
105. The full text of section 1714.4 reads:
(a) In a products liability action, no firearm or ammunition shall be deemed
defective in design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not outweigh
the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death
when discharged.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) The potential of a firearm or ammunition to cause serious injury, dam-
age or death when discharged does not make the product defective in design.
(2) Injuries or damages resulting from the discharge of a firearm or ammu-
nition are not proximately caused by its potential to cause serious injury, dam-
age, or death, but are proximately caused by the actual discharge of the product.
(c) This section shall not affect a products liability cause of action based upon
the improper selection of design alternatives.
(d) This section is declaratory of existing law.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1985).
106. Statutory interpretation of the acts of the California Legislature frequently proves
arduous for attorneys and the courts. See generally Comment, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in
Determining Legislative Intent in California: The Need for Standardized Criteria, 12 PAc.
L.J. 189 (1980); Smith, Legislative Intent: In Search of the Holy Grail, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 294
(1978). In stark contrast to the U.S. Congress, the California Legislature does not publish
daily records of legislative proceedings which include verbatim transcripts of debates. Commo-
dore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 649 P.2d 912, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270
(1982) (Mosk, J., concurring). "It is unfortunate that in California we do not have the
equivalent of the Congressional Record. Thus, we lack the ability to glean from verbatim floor
debates a common denominator or consensus reflecting views on a measure under considera-
tion." Id. at 221, 649 P.2d at 918, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 276. Nor does the Legislature habitually
publish committee reports, which are another extrinsic aid for statutory interpretation. Id.
Analysis of the statutory language itself thus frequently may be the sole source for determining
the meaning of a statute; it is certainly the primary source. California Teachers' Ass'n v. San
Diego Community College Dist., 28 Cal. 3d 692, 621 P.2d 856, 170 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1981).
But if the statutory language is ambiguous, California courts will refer to those extrinsic
sources which are available and which may bear on legislative intent. Id.; see also Southern
California Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 24 Cal. 3d 653, 596 P.2d 1149, 156 Cal. Rptr.
733 (1979).
The most frequently cited extrinsic aid is testimony, written or oral, by individual legisla-
tors about the arguments that were made in support of or against a particular bill. See gener-
ally California Teachers' Ass'n, 28 Cal. 3d 692, 621 P.2d 856, 170 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1981);
Larcher v. Wanless, 18 Cal. 3d 646, 654 n.10, 557 P.2d 507, 511 n.10, 135 Cal. Rptr. 75, 79
n.10 (1976); In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 589, 546 P.2d 1371, 1374, 128 Cal.
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The language of section 1714.4 is the logical starting point for
ascertaining the intent of the Legislature."0 7 Subsection (a) provides
that "no firearm ... shall be deemed defective in design on the
basis that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of
injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury ... The
operative language of subsection (a) squarely confronts the risk/util-
ity test of Barker v. Lull Engineering 0 9 It suggests an intent only
to prevent recovery in strict products liability based upon the theory
that a product causing injury is deemed defective if its design is the
Rptr. 427, 430 (1976); Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 257-58,
502 P.2d 1049, 1055, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767 (1972); Kriz v. Taylor, 92 Cal. App. 3d 302,
312, 154 Cal. Rptr. 824, 830-31 (1979); Stewart v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 80
Cal. App. 3d 172, 183, 143 Cal. Rptr. 641, 646-47 (1978); Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc. v. City of
Pittsburg, 52 Cal. App. 3d 983, 1007, 124 Cal. Rptr. 698, 715 (1975); Wheat v. Hall, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 928, 939, 108 Cal. Rptr. 508, 515 (1973); Rich v. State Bd. of Optometry, 235 Cal.
App. 2d 591, 603, 45 Cal. Rptr. 512, 519-20 (1965). Contra Comment, Statutory Interpreta-
tion in California: Individual Testimony as an Extrinsic Aid, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 241 (1980-
81). This practice is qualified, however, by the courts' refusal to accept statements by individ-
ual legislators which merely recite their personal reasons for supporting or opposing a
particular bill. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 588-91 546, P.2d 1371, 1374-75,
128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 430-31 (1976).
A second extrinsic aid courts will examine is the bill analysis, if one exists, prepared by
the committee with jurisdiction over the legislation. Southern California Gas Co., 24 Cal. 3d
653, 658-59, 596 P.2d 1149, 1152, 156 Cal. Rptr. 733, 736; Southland Mechanical Construc-
tors Corp. v. Nixen, 119 Cal. App. 3d 417, 428, 173 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922 (1981). Cf San
Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relation Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 850, 663 P.2d 523,
191 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1983). "While such records may ...be indicative of legislative intent
(citations omitted), they cannot be used to nullify the language of the statute as it was in fact
enacted." Id. at 863, 663 P.2d at 531, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 808. Contra Comment, The Use of
Extrinsic Aids in Determining Legislative Intent in California: The Need for Standardized
Criteria, 12 PA:. L.J. at 202-03.
A third extrinsic aid is the legislative process itself, particularly the amendments, if any,
which are adopted following the bill's introduction. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 264-65, 502 P.2d 1049, 1060, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 772 (1972); Kriz v.
Taylor, 92 Cal. App. 3d 302, 313, 154 Cal. Rptr. 824, 831 (1979); Stewart v. Board of Medi-
cal Quality Assurance, 80 Cal. App. 3d 172, 181, 143 Cal. Rptr. 641, 645 (1978); Lewis v.
Ryan, 64 Cal. App. 3d 330, 334-35, 134 Cal. Rptr. 355, 357 (1976); Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 1, 18-19, 120 Cal. Rptr. 233, 246-47 (1975); Benor v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 8 Cal. App. 3d 542, 546-47, 87 Cal. Rptr. 415, 418-19 (1970). Yet in the
absence of any apparent equivocation in the meaning of the statute which is the product of the
language alone, courts may refrain from any consideration of extrinsic sources. Estate of
Kramme, 20 Cal. 3d 567, 572, 573 P.2d 1369, 1372, 143 Cal. Rptr. 542, 545 (1978); Tripp v.
Swoap, 17 Cal. 3d 671, 679, 552 P.2d 749, 755, 131 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (1976); Pieri v. Fox,
96 Cal. App. 3d 802, 809, 158 Cal. Rptr. 256, 260 (1979).
107. California Teachers' Ass'n, 28 Cal. 3d 692, 621 P.2d 856, 170 Cal. Rptr. 817
(1981). "Although a court may properly rely on extrinsic aids, it should first turn to the words
of a statute to determine the intent of the Legislature." Id. at 698, 621 P.2d at 858-59, 170
Cal. Rptr. at 820.
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1985).
109. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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proximate cause of injury and the defendant fails to prove that the
inherent risk of injury which results from the product's design is
outweighed by its usefulness."1 '
The defendant would argue against such a narrow application
of section 1714.4 by contending that, in enacting AB 75, the
Legislature has established a general public policy prohibiting strict
products liability actions against the manufacturers and sellers of
firearms, including Saturday Night Specials. The proponent of this
position might point to subsection (b)(1), which provides: "The
potential of a firearm . . . to cause serious injury . . . when dis-
charged does not make the product defective in design.""'  Also,
under subsection (b)(2), "[i]njuries . . . resulting from the discharge
of a firearm . . . are not proximately caused by its potential to cause
injury . . . but . . . by the actual discharge of the product." 1 2
Arguably the import of these provisions is that a Saturday Night
Special alone, without something more, is not defective. The gist of
this argument is that the plaintiff must prove that the handgun mal-
functioned when used as it was intended to be used.
Against this, the plaintiff might counter that subsection (b)
merely amplifies subsection (a). Both speak to the "potential" of a
firearm to cause injury. Under this view, subsection (b) merely
makes plain that the ability of a firearm to injure a person is not to
be considered an inherent risk of the product under the risk/utility
design defect test of Barker, and is consistent with a narrow con-
struction of section 1714.4.
The plaintiff also might employ subsection (c) to buttress this
position. That subsection permits a products liability action "based
upon the improper selection of design alternatives" by the manufac-
turer." 3 The significance of this subsection is that it suggests an
unwillingness on the part of the Legislature to insulate the manufac-
turers and sellers of firearms from all strict products liability suits.
On the other hand, the defendant's rejoinder points out, subsection
(c) authorizes a single type of strict products liability action against
the manufacturers and sellers of firearms: the plaintiff must prove
that the gun malfunctioned when used as it is intended to be used
and that the failure in performance is the result of the manufac-
turer's conscious design choice. Another point which defense counsel
might assert is that the statute itself represents a pronouncement by
110. Id. at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
111. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1985).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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the Legislature that all firearms, including Saturday Night Specials,
are useful.
Faced with such legal parries between counsel for the plaintiff
and defendant over the appropriate scope of section 1714.4, the court
may turn to extrinsic aids in an effort to clarify the ambiguity which
results by resort to the statutory language alone."" The court may
accept into evidence a statement by Assemblyman McAlister or
another legislator, provided such a statement reveals the nature of
arguments made in support of, or in opposition to, passage of AB
75.5 Assemblyman McAlister's statement in support of AB 75"6 is
somewhat contradictory, and the legislative intent in enacting the bill
is unclear. In alluding to two pending lawsuits in which the risk/
utility design defect test of Barker served as the theory of liability,1
the assemblyman declared, "these suits in my opinion are without
merit and stretch the law of torts to the breaking point."1 "8
Since the foregoing remark refers to suits against the manufac-
tuier or seller of firearms which are brought on the basis of the risk/
utility design defect test of Barker, arguably the Legislature, in ap-
proving AB 75, intended only to bar this type of strict products lia-
bility suit. Later in his statement, however, Assemblyman McAlister
states, "AB 75 is intended to preclude courts from using products
liability theories to hold firearm manufacturers and dealers civilly
liable to anyone who has been shot by a firearm.""' The latter
remark suggests an intent to bar all strict products liability actions,
not only by victims of handgun shootings but also by handgun users,
against the manufacturers and sellers of firearms, including Saturday
Night Specials. Yet subsection (c) of the statute at the very least
makes it clear that section 1714.4 does not prohibit every type of
strict products liability suit against the manufacturers and sellers of
firearms. 20
114. See supra note 106.
115. Id.
116. Statement of Assemblyman Alister McAlister on AB 75 at 1 (1983) (on file at the
Santa Clara Law Review office).
117. See Assembly Committee on the Judiciary Analysis of AB 75. The analysis states:
"Currently, there are at least two such lawsuits pending in California .... [The plaintiffs
argue that firearms, usually the 'Saturday [Nlight [S]pecial' handgun variety, are 'inherently
defective' products because the danger posed by such items far outweighs any social benefits."
Id. at 1.
118. Statement of Assemblyman McAlister at 1 (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review
office).
119. Id.
120. Subsection (c) provides: "This section shall not affect a products liability cause of
action based upon the improper selection of design alternatives." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.4
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At still another juncture in his statement, the assemblyman iter-
ates that AB 75 "has been amended to affect only those lawsuits
which seek to impose liability on gun manufacturers and sellers on
this (sic) theory that a firearm ... is defective in design merely
because it causes injury when used." ' It is apparent that limiting
the extent of the inquiry on the intended scope of section 1714.4 to
the statutory language and Assemblyman McAlister's statement does
not resolve the ambiguity.' 22
In some recent decisions involving statutory interpretation, Cali-
fornia courts examined committee analyses prepared by the
appropriate Assembly or Senate committee with jurisdiction over the
enabling legislation.'22 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary pre-
pared such an analysis of AB 75 in anticipation of Senate considera-
tion of the bill.' 24 The Assembly Committee on the Judiciary also
prepared an analysis of AB 75; but because the Senate substantially
amended the legislation, comparatively little significance should be
placed on the Assembly committee's analysis in ascertaining the leg-
islative intent of AB 75.
The Senate committee's analysis criticizes the all-inclusive
compass of the version of AB 75 approved by the Assembly.'2 5 Spe-
cifically, the Senate committee wished to preserve the rights of the
(West 19851.
121. Statement of Assemblyman McAlister at 1 (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review
office).
122. The statement refers to amendments made by the Senate. The Senate considered
AB 75 after the Assembly approved it. Because the Assembly refused to concur with the Senate
amendments, the Senate and Assembly convened a conference committee. The responsibility of
the conference committee is to reconcile differences in the versions of the legislation passed by
each house of the Legislature. The product of the conference committee is embodied in a Con-
ference Report, which becomes the operative bill and which must be approved by each house.
123. See supra note 106.
124. Senate Analysis, supra note 65.
125. The-Senate Analysis cautioned:
While the bill was amended in the Assembly Judiciary Committee to exempt
liability for negligent entrustment (a form of furnishing), it cannot be guaran-
teed that the language might not be construed to preclude liability for some
other form of negligent furnishing. Another approach, perhaps simpler, would
be to apply AB 75 only to products liability actions.
Id.
The Senate Analysis further explains that:
The stated purpose of AB 75 is to 'stop at birth' the notion that manufacturers
and dealers are liable in products liability to victims of handgun usage. As al-
leged by plaintiffs in these types of suits ... , the handguns are 'inherently
defective products' because the danger posed by such items far outweighs any
social benefits.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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user or consumer of a firearm in the event that it misfires, or mal-
functions in some other way, inflicting injury upon the user or
consumer.126 The committee believed that the language of the As-
sembly version of AB 75, which required the plaintiff to prove that
the product malfunctioned, placed an unfair proof burden on this
group of potential plaintiffs.'27 In order to accommodate this con-
cern, the committee desired to retain the first prong of the design
defect test delineated by Barker.2 ' Under the first prong of that test,
the existence of a design defect may be proved upon a showing that
"the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner . .. ""'. This first prong of the design defect test of Barker
essentially creates a consumer expectation test, under which the user
of a firearm can sue the manufacturer or seller if a gun inflicts in-
jury on the user when it is used as a firearm is normally used.
An additional concern of the Senate committee was ensuring
that the language of AB 75 would only preclude so-called "Turley
suits."' 80 These suits against the manufacturers and sellers of hand-
guns, not all of which involve Saturday Night Specials, ask for the
imposition of strict liability on the basis of the risk/utility design
defect test of Barker.' Because the Senate determined that the lan-
guage of AB 75 as approved by the Assembly was too broad,"3 2 the
committee recommended an amendment to limit the scope of the bill
to strict products liability actions predicated upon the risk/utility
design defect test."8' The committee's analysis states that "it may
only be necessary to require proof of a malfunction in cases based on
the risk/utility test to prevent 'Turley suits.' "'"" The preceding lan-
guage of the committee analysis evinces a concern only for the risk/
126. "[lit may only be necessary to require proof of a malfunction in cases based on the
risk/utility test to prevent 'Turley suits.' " Id. Windle Turley is the author of Manufacturers'
and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 41 (1982). Mr. Turley
asserts, "The risk versus utility analysis provides a ready vehicle for imposing strict liability on
handgun suppliers." Id. at 53.
127. Senate Analysis, supra note 65, at 6-8. "[Tihe bill might prevent a gun-owner [sic]
from recovering from the manufacturer when he was injured as a result of a design defect in
his own gun." Id. at 6.
128. Id. at 7, 8. "The consumer expectation cause of action based on the expectancy test
could be preserved without lessening AB 75's impact on 'Turley suits' by defining malfunction
to include cases where the product failed to perform as safely as expected." Id.
129. 20 Cal. 3d at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
130. Senate Analysis, supra note 65, at 7. See supra note 126.
131. Senate Analysis, supra note 65, at 7, 8.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 130.
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utility test of what constitutes a design defect and is consistent with a
narrow interpretation of Civil Code Section 1714.4.'1 5 On the other
hand, the manufacturer or seller of a Saturday Night Special might
argue that the Senate committee's analysis provides further evidence
that the Legislature sought only to protect the user of a firearm
against injuries rather than to protect third-party victims of a
shooting.
However, amendments to AB 75 suggest that the Legislature
intended to leave room for alternative theories of liability, or at least
that the Legislature's concern is with but one type of strict products
liability action. The Assembly amended the bill three times before
passing it and referring it to the Senate."3 6 The Senate then pro-
ceeded to amend AB 75 twice before finally approving it.187 The
Senate amendments are substantial and also provide what ostensibly
became the operative language of section 1714.4.13' Whereas the
Assembly version of AB 75 specifically enumerated the types of ac-
tions which could be brought against the manufacturer or seller of a
firearm, the Senate version only prohibits one type of action. 3 9
135. Senate Analysis, supra note 65, at 7.
136. Assembly Final History at 126.
137. Id.
138. Conference Comm. Rep. No. 018895. The Conference Report on AB 75 repro-
duces the language of the bill as passed by each house of the Legislature. As passed by the
Assembly, the bill:
1) Amended existing provisions of the Civil Code to specify that no person,
organization, or public or business entity may be held legally accountable for
damages suffered as the result of furnishing (with or without consideration) a
firearm or ammunition, except where:
a) There is a manufacturing or design defect which causes a firearm to
malfunction;
b) There is a breach of a duty to warn related to a malfunction of the
firearm or ammunition due to a manufacturing or design defect; or
c) The furnishing of a firearm or ammunition is prohibited by law.
The Senate amendments delete the Assembly language and, instead, specify that:
1) In a products liability action, no firearm or ammunition shall be deemed
defective in design on the basis that its benefits do not outweigh the risk of
injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death when
discharged.
2) Ammunition or firearms are not defective in design simply because they have
the potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death when discharged.
3) Injuries or damages are proximately caused by the actual discharge of ammu-
nition or firearms, not by the potential of those products to cause serious injury,
damage or death.
4) The above provisions shall not affect a products liability cause of action based
on the improper selection of design alternatives.
139. Id.
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Since the Senate language prevailed over the Assembly language
in the version of the legislation that emerged from the conference
committee, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's analysis should
be accorded greater weight in any effort to determine legislative
intent than either the statement by Assemblyman McAlister or the
analysis prepared by the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary. The
particular concern of the Senate committee's analysis, and one which
is embodied in the actual language of section 1714.4, is that the
plaintiff should be prohibited from bringing an action against the
manufacturer or seller of a Saturday Night Special based upon the
risk/utility design defect test of Barker."" A credible argument can
be made that the imposition of strict liability on the manufacturer or
seller of a Saturday Night Special is not precluded by Civil Code
section 1714.4.
Nor is the possibility of bringing a successful action against the
manufacturer of a Saturday Night Special foreclosed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' recent ruling in Moore v. R.G. Industries,
Inc."' There the plaintiff sued Rohm Gescellschaft and R.G. Indus-
tries alleging that the handgun with which she was shot and
rendered a quadriplegic was, because of its small size and easy con-
cealability, defective in design. 4 The decision, although it acknowl-
edged the Kelley court's determination that Saturday Night Specials
serve no legitimate purposes, nevertheless sustained the lower court's
entry of summary judgment for the defendants. 4
The Moore court considered only the Barker test of a design
defect." 4 ' As the court conceded, "we apply the existing California
law, and do not predict possible changes in that law."' 145 The risk/
utility test of a design defect, it held, could not be applied in view of
section 1714.4.146 Because of constraints on its ability to consider
possible changes in, California strict products liability law,"" the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not actually consider that other
140. Senate Analysis, supra note 65. "Proponents of handgun liability suits assert that
the availability of 'Saturday Night Special' handguns to the general public causes widespread
and severe harm without conferring any substantial social benefit." Id. at 9.
141. 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986).
142. Id. at 1327.
143. Id. at 1328.
144. Id. at 1327.
145. Id. (citing Klingebiel v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 494 F.2d 345, 346 (9th Cir.
1974)).
146. Moore, 789 F.2d at 1327.
147. There is now no procedure by which the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals can certify
questions of law to the California Supreme Court as was done in Kelley. See supra note 85
and accompanying text.
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laws and policies of California might permit an extension of the
Kelley decision. " 8 Thus in spite of the court's averment that "there
is no indication in California law or public policy that the courts
would distinguish 'Saturday [N]ight [S]pecials' from other hand-
guns,""'9 there is authority to support an extension of the Kelley
decision.
VI. APPLYING THE KELLEY RULING IN CALIFORNIA
The appropriate case for an attorney to argue for adoption of
the Kelley decision will involve the following scenario. The plaintiff
is the victim, or the victim's survivor, of a criminal shooting. The
gun used by the criminal assailant to injure or kill the victim is a
Saturday Night Special. The victim is not someone who participated
in the criminal act.
The initial task of the attorney is to isolate the scope of Civil
Code section 1714.4. Plaintiff's attorney should focus first on the
statutory language of that section, " asserting that the language is
sufficiently definite in ruling out only an action based upon the risk/
utility prong of the Barker test for a design defect. "' Section 1714.4
does not bar all types of strict products liability actions against the
manufacturers of firearms, but rather only one. The bill analysis
prepared by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary is an extrinsic
source to which the plaintiff's attorney may wish to direct the court's
attention. The attorney should argue for an interpretation of section
1714.4 that is consistent with the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary's concern that the section be read only to prevent so-called
"Turley suits," which proceed upon the risk/benefit prong of the
Barker test of a design defect.' 52
Concomitantly, a distinction must be made between the risk/
utility test of Barker and the theory of strict liability embraced by
the Kelley decision. By allowing the trier of fact to weigh differences
in the inherent risk of a product against its usefulness, a court at
least implicitly makes a prior determination that the product serves
some legitimate purposes. The ruling in Kelley, on the other hand, is
premised upon the notion that Saturday Night Specials serve "no
148. The attorney will encounter some difficulties in attempting to keep the case in the
state courts. If plaintiff sues a foreign national corporation in a state court, that party is likely
to exercise the right of removal to a federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948).
149. Moore, 789 F.2d at 1327.
150. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 130-35 and accompanying text.
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legitimate purpose in today's society." 15 The court's finding is
grounded in the law and policies of the federal government and the
State of Maryland.15
4
Next, the attorney must demonstrate that imposing strict liabil-
ity upon the manufacturer or seller of a Saturday Night Special
under the Kelley theory will further California public policy.
California public policy on handguns is found in the Dangerous
Weapons Control Law." "The Dangerous Weapons Control Law
is designed to minimize the danger to public safety arising from the
free access to firearms that can be used for crimes of violence." '
The provisions of California's Dangerous Weapons Control Law are
in many respects similar to the gun control laws of the State of
Maryland.
A concealed weapon is defined under the Dangerous Weapons
Control Law as a firearm with a barrel shorter than twelve
inches.157 A person who carries a concealed weapon must have a
license.1 58 However, an individual who carries a concealed weapon
on the premises of his or her own residence or place of business is
not required to have a license."' Other people whom the state does
not require to have a license in order to carry a concealed weapon
include law enforcement personnel, members of the armed forces,
and people who use handguns for target shooting, provided they be-
long to a recognized club or organization. 60 Furthermore, carrying a
firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony
is punishable by an additional prison sentence of one year."' Actual
use of a firearm to commit or attempt to commit a felony is punisha-
ble by an additional term of imprisonment for two years.1 2 These
provisions of the Dangerous Weapons Control Law suggest some of
153. Kelley, 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158.
154. Id. at 147, 497 A.2d at 1154.
155. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12000-12601 (West 1982).
156. People v. Scott, 24 Cal. 2d 774, 151 P.2d 517 (1944); see also People v.
Washington, 237 Cal. App. 2d 59, 46 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1965). "The clear intent of the Legisla-
ture in adopting the weapons control act was to limit as far as possible the use of instruments
commonly associated with criminal activity." Id. at 66, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
157. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001 (West 1982).
158. Id. at § 12025 (Note that a license differs from a permit, the latter of which is
required under the Maryland gun control statutes. A permit is required for each firearm pur-
chased, while a license authorizes the ownership of firearms for a particular period, which, in
California, is three years.).
159. Id. at § 12026.
160. Id. at § 12027.
161. Id. at § 12022.
162. Id. at § 12022.5.
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the purposes for which handgun ownership is recognized as legiti-
mate: protection of one's home or business, law enforcement, and
sport.
The defendant manufacturer of Saturday Night Specials also
will postulate that many homeowners and business persons may
purchase Saturday Night Specials expressly for such purposes. The
natural conclusion to this syllogism is that Saturday Night Specials
serve some legitimate purposes. This would bring the plaintiff's
cause of action within the purview of section 1714.4.
The Kelley ruling eschews this syllogism. Saturday Night Spe-
cials are characterized in the court's opinion as "too inaccurate,
unreliable, and poorly made for use by . . . homeowners and busi-
nessmen."' "8 Merely because handgun ownership is legitimate to
protect one's home or business, it does not follow that all types of
handguns are appropriate for these purposes. The plaintiff must em-
phasize state gun control policies to justify a ruling that Saturday
Night Specials are not appropriate for protecting one's home or busi-
ness and, therefore, serve no legitimate purposes.' 64
Additional support for the proposition that Saturday Night Spe-
cials serve no legitimate purposes can be found in sections 12028 and
12030 of the California Penal Code. Those sections, which also are
part of the Dangerous Weapons Control Law, permit law enforce-
ment authorities to do one of three things with firearms that are
confiscated pursuant to a criminal investigation. If found useful for
"sporting, recreational, or collection purposes," the weapons may be
sold to the public. 6 Alternatively, they may be retained by the
confiscating authority or donated to federal or state branches of the
military, provided the weapons would serve some "useful" pur-
pose.' 66 Otherwise, the firearms must be destroyed. 6 It must be em-
163. Kelley, 304 Md. at 54, 497 A.2d at 1158.
164. The defendant would seem to have the upper hand with respect to federal law and
policy toward Saturday Night Specials, since a handgun which is not suitable for sporting
purposes nevertheless may be appropriate for self-protection. Whether a particular type of
handgun can be imported depends upon its suitability for sporting purposes. See supra note 3.
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the federal Gun Control Act prohibit the importation of
Saturday Night Specials. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
165. CAL. PENAL. CODE § 12028 (West 1982). Subsection (b) provides: "A firearm of
any nature used in the commission of any misdemeanor as provided in this code or any felony,
or an attempt to commit any misdemeanor as provided in this code or any felony, is, upon a
conviction of the defendant, a nuisance." In addition subsection (c) authorizes the law enforce-
ment agencies to "offer the weapons, which the officers in charge of them consider to have
value with respect to sporting, recreational, or collective purposes, for sale at public auction to
persons licensed under federal law to engage in business involving any weapon purchased." Id.
166. Id. at § 12030.
167. Id. at § 12028.
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phasized that no law enforcement authority would donate a Saturday
Night Special to the military, retain it for law enforcement purposes,
or make it available for public sale. 68
The attorney also must impress upon the court that reliance
upon the common law to create a special category of strict products
liability for the manufacturers and sellers of Saturday Night Specials
would not be inconsistent with prior extensions of the common law.
As the California Supreme Court stated in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp. :169
The inherent capacity of the common law for growth and
change is its most significant feature. Its development has been
determined by the social needs of the community which it
serves. It is constantly expanding and developing in keeping
with advancing civilization and the new conditions and progress
of society, and adapting itself to . . . the needs of the
country.' 70
The California Supreme Court applied this notion of the common
law most notably in Li v. Yellow Cab'7' and again in American
Motorcycle Assn v. Superior Court.7 2 In those cases, the Supreme
Court embraced common law theories of comparative fault and com-
parative partial indemnity, respectively. "Nothing in the legislative
history," the court wrote in American Motorcycle, "suggests that the
Legislature intended by the enactment to preempt the field. ... "'"
The rulings in both cases reflect the court's reliance on the common
law to foster contemporary notions of justice.'7 4
168. The San Jose Police Deptartment destroys all confiscated Saturday Night Specials
which have been used in the commission of a crime. Twice each year these weapons are de-
stroyed pursuant to court order. Telephone Conversation with Dwight Messimer, administra-
tive assistant to San Jose Police Chief Joseph D. McNamara, July 14, 1987.
169. 12 Cal. 3d 765, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1978).
170. Id. at 393, 525 P.2d at 676, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 772 (citing 15 AM. JUR. 2D Com-
mon Law §§ 1, 2 at 794-96).
171. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
172. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
173. Id. at 601, 578 P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197. In both cases the court accepted
the premise that the statutes were merely codifications of the common law. See Li, 13 Cal. 3d
at 814, 532 P.2d at 1233, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 865; American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 601, 578
P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
174. See Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 814, 532 P.2d at 1233, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 865 and American
Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 602, 603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198. Assuming argu-
endo that section 1714.4 codifies the existing common law, a probable counter argument to the
courts looking beyond the statute for purposes of developing a special category of strict prod-
ucts liability is timing or ripeness. Section 1714.4 was enacted in 1983. In both Li and Ameri-
can Motorcycle, considerable time elapsed before the Supreme Court was willing to look be-
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Subpart (d) of section 1714.4 states: "This section is declaratory
of existing law." ' Because section 1714.4 concerns the application
of the risk/utility test, and since the Barker decision established that
test for determining defects in design, it is arguable that subpart (d)
renders section 1714.4 the law as of the date of the Barker decision.
Barker created a common law rule. Implicitly, then, the Legislature
must intend that section 1714.4 be regarded as part of the Barker
decision. There is no indication in the legislative history of an intent
to preempt the courts from further development of the law of strict
products liability, even as it concerns the manufacturers of fire-
arms.17 6 What the Legislature proscribes is only the application of
the risk/utility test of what constitutes a defective design to manufac-
turers and sellers of firearms.1 7 7
Finally, the attorney must demonstrate that creating a special
category of common law strict products liability applicable to Satur-
day Night Specials would not place any unfair burden on either
citizens who wish to lawfully purchase handguns for legitimate pur-
poses or the manufacturers and sellers of handguns. This theory of
strict products liability would remove from the marketplace only
those handguns which serve none of the legitimate purposes of hand-
gun ownership recognized by California law and public policy.1 78
Such a ruling against the manufacturers and sellers of Saturday
Night Specials should have no measurable effect upon the ability of
citizens to lawfully purchase handguns for legitimate uses.
Arguing for recovery pursuant to the criteria delineated by the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.
should convince the court that the defendants in such a suit would
yond the statutes and embrace a new common law rule. See generally G. CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). According to Calabresi, hoary statutes
should be viewed like old common law rulings, and courts should be able to overrule such
statutes in favor of a common law rule which more accurately reflects what he labels the "legal
landscape." Id. at 120-21. In seeking to determine whether a statute still fits the legal land-
scape, courts should ask: "Has the common law surrounding the statute been so altered that
the old rule no longer fits in its current form?" Id. at 129. But a recently enacted statute,
concludes Calabresi, deserves greater deference. Id. at 132. Consider, however, that section
1714.4 does not define the rule of strict products liability law in the sense that the statutes at
issue in Li and American Motorcycle defined the law of contributory negligence and joint and
several liability, respectively. Section 1714.4 merely declares that a particular common law
rule cannot be applied to the manufacturer or seller of firearms. The statute does not preempt
the field of strict products liability.
175. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1985).
176. See generally, Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 018895.
177. See supra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
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not be unfairly subject to liability.179 Liability should not be imposed
unless the plaintiff or the plaintiff's decedent suffers injury or death
as the innocent victim of a criminal act. After the initial decision
imposing liability, no recovery should be granted to future plaintiffs
unless the handgun is shown to have been sold by the original seller
after the date of the court's initial ruling. The burden of proof on
this latter issue should fall upon the defendants, as they possess a
superior ability to present evidence of the date on which the particu-
lar Saturday Night Special was first sold.1 80
VII. CONCLUSION
At first glance, section 1714.4 of the Civil Code appears to pre-
empt any legal recourse by the victim of a deliberate shooting against
the manufacturer or seller of a Saturday Night Special. A close
examination of that section reveals that, to the contrary, section
1714.4 concerns only so-called "Turley suits," that is, actions based
upon the risk/utility design defect test of Barker v. Lull Engineer-
ing Co.181 That section does not preclude a suit against the manufac-
turer or seller of a Saturday Night Special under a theory of com-
mon law strict liability that Saturday Night Specials serve no
legitimate purposes.
An action should be brought in California against the manufac-
turer or seller of a Saturday Night Special. The plaintiff should
advocate adoption of the ruling of the Maryland Court of Appeal in
Kelly v. R.G. Industries, Inc.18 2 That court held that Saturday
Night Specials serve no legitimate purposes and that the imposition
of strict liability upon the manufacturer and seller for the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff would further federal and state gun control
policies. In making a successful argument for the adoption of the
Kelley decision, plaintiff's counsel must argue: (1) for a narrow
interpretation of Civil Code Section 1714.4; and (2) that the gun
control policies of California would support such an extension of the
common law.
California gun control policies are substantially similar to those
of the State of Maryland. Therefore, a California court may be will-
ing to embrace the rationale of Kelly v. R.G. Industries and apply
such a novel common law theory of strict products liability against
179. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 159-62, 497 A.2d at 1160-62.
180. Id. at 162 n.31, 497 A.2d at 1162 n.31.
181. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
182. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
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the manufacturer or seller of a Saturday Night Special. Such a rul-
ing would contribute to a reduction in the rate of violent crime com-
mitted in this state by persons using firearms and the elimination
from the marketplace of a handgun which serves none of the legiti-
mate purposes for handgun ownership recognized by the laws and
public policy of California.
Garrett Sanderson III

